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1 Introduction
In response to the pressing concern over the problem of climate change due to high concen-
tration of greenhouse gases (GHGs) in the atmosphere, the international community agreed
on the United Nations Framework on Climate Change Convention (UNFCCC) in 1992. The
ultimate aim of this international convention is to reduce the GHG emissions. To put together
concrete mechanisms to be adopted by the member countries, 41 Annex I countries ratied
the Kyoto Protocol, which is an international agreement linked to the UNFCCC. The major
feature of the Kyoto Protocol is that it sets binding targets for the Annex I countries to reduce
the GHG emissions in their countries by 5 percent against 1990 level over the 5-year period
2008-2012 (UNFCCC, 2010a).
The Kyoto Protocol o¤ers the Annex I countries some exibility in meeting their emission
reduction targets by introducing 3 mechanisms, namely emission trading scheme (ETS), clean
development mechanism (CDM) and joint implementation (JI). ETS allows countries that
have not used all the emission permitted to them to sell their excess capacity to countries that
have exceeded their targets. CDM allows the Annex I countries to invest in GHG reduction
projects or ventures in the non-Annex I countries as an alternative to more expensive emission
reductions in their own countries. The objectives of CDM are twofold: rst, it helps Annex
I countries to achieve their emission reduction targets, and second, it contributes towards
sustainable development in non-Annex I countries. Appendix I describes how the CDM works
in more detail. JI allows the Annex I countries to pay for emission reduction projects in other
Annex I countries. Among these di¤erent innovative mechanisms under the Kyoto Protocol,
this paper focuses on evaluating the e¢ cacy of the CDM in reducing GHG emissions in Annex
I and non-Annex I countries by using a theoretical framework.
Since the costs of GHG emission reduction are typically much lower in non-Annex I coun-
tries than in Annex I countries, Annex I countries can comply with their emission reduction
target under the Kyoto Protocol at much lower cost by receiving credits for sponsoring emis-
sion reduction in non-Annex I countries. However, it is important that the administration
costs involved in the CDM project remain at low level. As pointed out by Michaelowa and
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Jotzo (2005), transaction cost and institutional barriers in host countries could a¤ect the size
of CDM projects.
The recently concluded 2009 United Nations Climate Change Conference or the Copen-
hagen Summit held in Copenhagen, Denmark during 7th -18th December 2009 brought all
world leaders together in an e¤ort to tackle the problem of GHG emissions. It is now obvious
that if CDM is to continue, it has to contribute to the overall objective of reducing GHG
emission level globally, which is an important stand of our paper. It requires the CDM to
have impact on the emission levels of the host countries as well as the sponsoring countries.
Though this Copenhagen summit did not result in concrete decisions and commitment, all
the participants reached an agreement that curbing GHG emissions and tackling the climate
change problem are of high priority. During the process of discussion and negotiation, special
attention was placed on the high emitters of GHGs, such as the US, China, India, Brazil and
South Africa as tackling the climate change problem truly requires cooperation from these
countries as well as international cooperation. The Copenhagen Accord, which was drafted
on 18th December 2009, requires the governments of Annex I countries to submit their pledges
for curbing GHG emissions (also known as emission reduction targets) by 31st January 2010.
As of 1st February 2010, 55 countries sent their pledges, including EU member states, US,
Japan, Brazil, China, India and South Africa, which are the principal architects of the Copen-
hagen Accord (BBC, 20101 ). Most of these countries reiterate the pledges made before the
Copenhagen Summit, but some of these pledges are weaker. Apart from these pledges, at the
Copenhagen Summit, it was agreed that Annex I countries should support the implementa-
tion of adaptation action in developing countries through nancial resources, technology and
capacity building. Developing and least developed countries should receive funding to be used
for building resilience against changing climate and to be used for mitigation activities. The
implementation of the Copenhagen Accord would be assessed to ensure that the increase in
global temperature is restricted to below 2 degrees Celsius.
The reforms agreed at the Copenhagen Summit should make it easier for GHG emission
1BBC(2010). http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/sci/tech/8492450.stm
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reduction projects hosted by the non-Annex I countries to qualify for the CDM initiative.
However, the UN released a number of technical documents, including an agreed set of changes
to the operation of the CDM entitled Further guidance relating to the clean development
mechanism(UNFCC, 2010b). Under such agreement, the CDM Executive Board has been
granted permission to streamline registration and issuance procedures for emission reduction
projects, and provide new funding to accelerate the development of CDM projects in non-
Annex I countries having less than 10 approved CDM projects in operation. In addition, the
reforms also call for an improved system of continuous performance monitoring for the third-
party certiers that assess requests for registration and issuance. The reforms urge the CDM
Executive Board to take e¤ective action to ensure compliance with established timeliness for
each of its procedures and request the Executive Board to continue its e¤orts to improve the
e¢ ciency and impartiality of the operation of the CDM.
Although CDM would continue its existence after the Copenhagen Summit, giving exi-
bility and cost-e¤ectiveness in the way that GHG emission reductions could be achieved by
the Annex I countries, some controversial issues about the CDM still remain. There is a
concern that the net e¤ect of the CDM process is that it will lead to an increase in global
GHG emissions as the Annex I countries will use the CER credits to allow for higher domestic
emissions without reducing emissions in the non-Annex I countries hosting the CDM projects.
This is the concern our paper addresses.
One strand of literature which discusses CDMs contribution to sustainable development,
help one of the objectives of CDM. Watson and Frankheuser (2009) analysed 409 CDM
projects, (roughly 10 percent of those in the pipeline in October, 2008) under broader de-
nitions of sustainable development which include economic growth co-benets. They found
that 82 percent of CDM projects contributed to employment and 67 percent contributed to
social capital mainly through training. Sutter and Parreno (2007) also conclude that running
projects with objectives of allowing non-Annex I countries to achieve sustainable development
and helping enhance the compliance by the Annex I countries, is a di¢ cult task. Olsen(2007)
provides a comprehensive literature review of CDMs contribution to sustainable development.
4
Her results show that CDM does not make a signicant contribution to sustainable develop-
ment. A question that often arises is what is sustainable development in the rst place?
According to Olsen(2007)s literature review, sustainable development can be scoped it
into three areas: social (includes poverty alleviation and equity), economic and environment.
Which area of sustainable development the CDM projects aim to target at depends on the
priorities of the host countries and the authorities (Brown and Corbern, 2003). Sutter and
Parreno (2007) make an important point that because of the competition among the non-
Annex I countries to attract the investment that come along with the CDM projects, the non-
Annex I countries are willing to lower the sustainable development level. On the other hand,
Olsen and Fenhann (2008) suggest that there should be an international standard to assess
sustainable development benets. Although helping the non-Annex I countries to achieve
sustainable development is certainly an important issue, in our paper, we do not evaluate the
e¢ cacy of CDM in terms of its contribution to sustainable development. We, instead, focus
on the impact of CDM on the level of GHG emissions across the two groups of countries.
The following literature addresses the issue whether CDM projects help assist the non-
Annex I countries in moving away from fossil fuels towards renewable energy. Pearson (2007)
notes that CDM is shy of nancing projects that assist host countries to move towards renew-
able technologies in the long term. Pearson also nds that Annex I countries invest in projects
that give them cheap credits, not ones that guide non Annex I countries away from fossil fuels.
Mathy et al. (2001) uses the Indian power sector as an example to show that CDM-type mech-
anism does not go beyond providing cheap carbon credits for Annex I countries with emission
reduction targets. In this paper, we do not investigate this problem associated with CDM. We
assume that the CDM projects involve ventures that genuinely help reduce GHG emissions,
but due to the incentive problems on the part of Annex I and non-Annex I countries, the
global emissions could increase as a result of CDM.
Other papers discuss the additionality of CDM projects, which in turn determine the
CER credits resulted from the CDM project, using information from existing projects (see
Michaelowa and Purohit, 2007; Haya, 2007; Schneider, 2007). These papers express concern
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that the methodology of calculating additionality are not transparent, inconsistent and incor-
rect. What exactly is considered to be additionality of CDM projects is quite vague, making
the assessment quite problematic. Shrestha and Timilsina (2002) also highlight similar prob-
lems, especially the fact that solely relying on economic additionality as a criterion would not
achieve the objective of mitigating emissions. They also emphasise the need to look at the
overall impact of CDM projects on the sector when choosing projects. Michaelowa (2008) ar-
gues that, in practice, it is di¢ cult to establish or verify the additionality from each proposed
CDM project. The key problem is related to the incentives of the rms in the non-Annex I
countries: by anticipating that the low-carbon technology will be transferred to them under
the CDM projects, the rms in the non-Annex I countries might have incentives to delay
the adoption of such technology, which they intend to acquire in any case through their own
funds. In this sense, even though the CDM gives the Annex I countries that sponsor the
CDM projects the CER credits to be used to achieve their emission reduction targets under
the Kyoto Protocol, it does not result in substantial additional reduction in greenhouse-gas
emissions. Our paper shows a similar result that CDM does not necessarily lead to reduction
in the total level of greenhouse-gas emissions. However, the causes of incentive problem is
di¤erent in our model and we do not embed the additionality issue in our theoretical analysis.
Lecocq and Ambrosi (2007) argue that the vagueness of additionality makes it di¢ cult to get
the CDM project approved by the CDM Executive Board.
Another strand of literature on CDM focuses on studying the inequitable distribution of
CDM projects across the developing countries. According to Michaelowa (2005), the CDM
projects have been over-concentrated in the middle-income developing countries such as China
and India, while the least developed countries have been mostly neglected. The same problem
is highlighted in Jung (2006), Zhang and Mariyuma (2001) and Dutschke and Michaelowa
(2006). A possible reason could be that it is easier to establish additionality in the middle-
income developing countries and there is more opportunity to nd suitable projects to partici-
pate in the CDM scheme. Banuri and Gupta (2000) suggest the CDM Executive Board to give
more CERs to Annex I countries which sponsor CDM projects in non-Annex I countries with
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lower GDP per capita. Lecocq and Ambrosi (2007) suggest that CDM projects should only be
hosted by least developed countries. These suggestions are to assist least developed countries
to get some benet from CDM. Our paper, does not exactly look at the issue of distribution
of CDM projects across the non-Annex I countries on the ground of income. We, however
make recommendation based on our analysis on how the CDM Executive Board should select
the non-Annex I countries to host CDM projects.
Hagem and Holtsmark (2009) do a forecast of future emissions and ask the question whether
there is a future for CDM, i.e. whether CDM serves any purpose in the international agenda.
High transaction costs and over-estimation of emission reduction make CDM unattractive.
CDM should be designed in such a way that developing countries have more incentive to take
part in reducing emission in their countries and trade the resulted CER credits.
Another related issue that has been discussed is whether the Kyoto Protocol leads to
carbon leakage. Carbon leakage is dened as the ratio of an increase in emission as a result
of implementing Kyoto Protocol in a non-abating country (non-Annex I country) over the
reduction of emission by an abating country (Annex I country). Carbon leakage happens
when abating countries relocate to non-abating countries because CDM projects generate
CERs, making emission abatement cheaper in non-Annex I countries. Various studies nd
that carbon leakage is in the range of 5 - 20 percent (Manne and Richels, 1999; Hourcade and
Shukla, 2001). Babiker (2005) has done an extensive empirical study to show that there is a
very high carbon leakage of 50 - 130 percent. Glomsrod and Taoyuan (2005) use a general
equilibrium model to show that coal cleaning through CDM projects in China will in fact
result in a net increase of carbon dioxide emissions. Similarly, Bohrinnger et al. (2003) argue
that when Germany invests in CDM projects in the Indian power sector, it will ultimately
result in an increase in emissions due to emissions in other sectors increase.
Unless a stronger connection between sustainable development and reduction in GHG
emissions could be established, sustainable development should not be a criteria for CDM
projects to be approved, say Ellis et al (2007). Wara (2007a) points out that about two thirds
of the CDM projects are not involved in reducing carbon dioxide, which is key if we are to
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tackle global warming. He recommends that CDM should aim at reducing carbon dioxide
and the emphasis it should place in the future should be on tackling global warming. Wara
(2007b) discusses the ine¢ ciency associated with the operation of CDM, especially the fact
that its current form promotes strategic behaviour on the part of Annex I countries to secure
more CER credits which does not necessarily lead to emission reduction and thus not tackle
the problem of global warming. This point made by Wara (2007b) is consistent with the
arguments we make in this paper. He emphasises the need for CDM to be reformed - either
the procedure of the current form should be strengthened to ensure that CER credits are given
according to real additionality without increasing transaction cost or project risk, or it should
move away from the market-based form to a fund-based form similar to the Multilateral fund
of the Montreal Protocol which was very successful in reducing ozone depleting substances.
Non-Annex I countries should then be nanced by a common Climate fund with contributions
from all Annex I countries according to their e¤orts in reducing the GHG emissions.
According to Paulson (2009), much of the literature on CDM seems to devote much e¤ort
in ne-tuning CDM. Invitation was given to academics to theoretically analyse CDM in order
to take it into the future, especially after knowing from the outcome of the Copenhagen
Summit that CDM will continue to be used after the rst commitment period of the Kyoto
Protocol is over. The contributions of our paper to the literature related to CDM are twofold.
First of all, it provides a formal theoretical model which allow us to have a clearer perspective
of the clean development mechanism. Secondly, it asks a very pertinent question about the
role of CDM in the reduction of GHG emissions at the global level. The reason why UN has
introduced emission targets and suggesting methods to assist Annex I countries in achieving
these targets, international conferences and brain storming etc, are to come up with ways in
which to tackle the problem of ever increasing GHG emissions. So, it is important to ask
the question, how e¤ective is CDM in reducing emissions in Annex I countries, non-Annex I
countries and at the global level.
In our paper, we use a two-country (Annex I and non-Annex I country) framework to show
that CDM does not necessarily lead to a reduction in global GHG emissions. The results from
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our formal analysis show that, given that the non-Annex I country already produced at its
optimum level in the absence of the CDM disregarding the consequences of its production
on the environment, it will not respond to the presence of CDM projects by increasing its
domestic emission, thus, the emissions in such non-Annex I country will be reduced by the
amount generated by the CDM project sponsored by the Annex I country. For the Annex
I country, the opportunity to reduce GHG emissions abroad at a cheaper cost would cause
the Annex I country to sponsor abatement project in the non-Annex I country, expanding
its domestic production thus generating more domestic emissions. When this is the case, the
reduction in the GHG emission in the non-Annex I country will be o¤set by an increase in
emissions in the Annex I country, leaving the global level of GHG emissions unchanged despite
the presence of the CDM project.
We also consider another scenario in which, in the absence of the CDM, the non-Annex I
country was producing less than its capacity because it was concerned about the damage its
production imposes on the environment. Under this scenario, with abatement resulted from
the CDM project sponsored by the Annex I country, our analysis shows that the non-Annex
I country will expand its production and thus domestic emissions. This is due to the fact
that abatements achieved through the CDM project is being double counted, both against
the Annex Is emission limit under the Kyoto Protocol and against the self-imposed limit on
emission of the non-Annex I country.2 In this case, the CDM will lead to an increase in the
total level of GHG emissions across the two countries.
Despite its simple set-up, the analysis presented in this paper puts forward a formal the-
oretical model that helps us to have better understanding on how the CDM works as well
as emphasises some problems or controversial issues associated with the CDM, especially the
problem of double counting of CERs. Moreover, this analysis also helps us in formulating
the policy recommendations on how to improve the e¢ ciency of the operation of the CDM,
bearing in mind that this initiative would continue to be used to promote compliance by the
2Even though non-Annex countries are not bound by any legally binding emission reduction targets, the self-
imposed constraint captures our observation that the developing countries have a reduction in GHG emission
and tackling of climate change on their agenda.
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Annex I countries to the GHG emission reduction targets pledged under the Kyoto Protocol
and after the Copenhagen Summit.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the model and
its analysis. Section 3 looks at the benchmark case in the absence of the CDM, and Section
4 looks at what happens with the presence of the CDM. Section 5 concludes. The detailed
discussion about the operation of the CDM is contained in the appendix.
2 Production and Abatement
Consider two countries, an Annex I country and a non-Annex I country. The Annex I country
is subject to a binding limit on emissions set by an outside authority such as the Kyoto
Protocol, k, where k > 0.3 The non-Annex I country is not subject to such legally binding
limits but has a self-imposed limit on emissions. The self-imposed limit on emission captures
the fact that usually countries can tolerate emission up to some limit. How high the toleration
level is for the non-Annex I country, plays a role in determining the e¢ cacy of CDM. This
helps capture the point that after the Copenhagen summit, several developing countries have
endeavour to reduce their emission intensity as discussed in the Introduction. The self-imposed
limit of the non-Annex country I is denoted by s. Annex I country also has an emission
toleration limit but we assume that it is higher than k. We begin by establishing a benchmark
case in the absence of the CDM. We then go on to analyse what happens to the level of
production and emission in the two countries when the CDM is in operation. We then make
some comparisons between the two cases.
2.1 The benchmark model
First, we study what happen in the Annex I country, which produces an industrial output,
y. Its benet function is given by B (y), where we assume that B(y) satises the following
conditions: B0 (y)  0, B00 (y) < 0, lim
y!0
B0(y) = 1 and 9 y, where 0 < y < 1, such that
B0 (y) = 0 (i.e. y is the maximum amount of output the Annex I country is able to produce).
3We recognise that in reality the Kyoto target is the GHG emissions reduction. However, without loss of
generality, we model it as the limit on emission level itself.
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Each unit of y generates e > 0 units of emission as a by-product. To comply with k,
the Annex I country can choose to undertake some domestic abatement, denoted by a. The
abatement cost function is given by c(a), where c0(a)  0 and c00(a) > 0. We assume that
k < ey.4
The Annex I country chooses output, y, and abatement, a, to maximise its net benet
subject to the constraint on emissions set by the Kyoto Protocol.
max
y;a
B(y)  c(a) (1)
subject to ey   a  k; a  0 and y > 0:
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions are given by5:
B0(y) = e, y > 0; (2)
  c0(a), a  0; (3)
ey   a  k,   0; (4)
where  denotes the lagrange multiplier. From above, it can be easily shown that the constraint
on emissions will always bind, thus
ey   a = k,  > 0:
Let (y; a) be the solutions to the above maximisation problem. It follows from (2)
that y < y, and thus the Annex I country needs to undertake some output reduction (i.e.
producing less than y) in order to meet its binding limit on emission. If c0(0)  , the Annex
I country meets its allowed limit solely through a reduction in output (i.e. a = 0) while if
4If k  ey, no emission reduction is required by the Annex I country.
5Note that given Lagrangian function, L, the Kuhn-Tucker conditions are given by,
@L
@y
 0; y  0

;

@L
@a
 0; a  0

;

@L
@
= k   ey + a  0;   0

:
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c0(0) < , it meets its allowed limit through a combination of output reduction and abatement
(i.e. a > 0).
Next, we study what happen in the non-Annex I country. The benet function of the
non-Annex I country is given by ~B(~y), where ~y denotes the industrial output produced in
the non-Annex I country. We assume that ~B(~y) satises the following conditions: ~B0(~y)  0,
~B00(~y) < 0, lim
~y!0
~B0(~y) = 1 and 9
_
~y, where 0 <
_
~y < 1, such that ~B0
_
~y

= 0 (i.e.
_
~y is the
maximum amount of output the non-Annex I country is able to produce).
Each unit of ~y generates ~e > 0 units of emission as a by-product. To comply with s,
the non-Annex I country can choose to undertake some domestic abatement, denoted by ~a.
The abatement cost function is given by ~c(~a), where ~c0(~a)  0 and ~c00(~a) > 0. We make the
assumption that the non-Annex I country nds abatement more expensive than the Annex I
country for all levels of abatement, a; therefore, that the non-Annex I country lacks incentives
to abate.
The non-Annex I country chooses output, ~y, and abatement, ~a, to maximise its net benet
subject to the self-imposed constraint on emissions:
max
~y;~a
~B(~y)  ~c(~a) (5)
subject to ~e~y   ~a  s; ~a  0 and ~y > 0:
We assume that
_
~y < y and ~e > e which mean the non-Annex I is poorer and uses a dirtier
technology, respectively.
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions are given by:
~B0(~y) = ~~e, ~y > 0; (6)
~  ~c0(~a), ~a  0; (7)
~e~y   ~a  s, ~  0; (8)
where ~ denotes the lagrange multiplier.
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Let (~y; ~a) denote the solutions to the above programme. There are two cases to be
considered: when the non-Annex I countrys self-imposed constraint, given by (8), does not
bind and when it binds. For future reference, the subscripts 1 and 2 are used to refer to
the case where the non-Annex I countrys self-imposed constraint does not bind and bind,
respectively.
Under scenario 1, when s is su¢ ciently high such that its self-imposed constraint does not
bind, it implies that this non-Annex I country will produce up to its maximum (~y =
_
~y) and
choose to undertake no abatement (~a = 0). When this is the case, the total level of emissions
across the two countries is E1 = k + ~e
_
~y and the total production across the two countries is
Y1 = y
 +
_
~y.
Under scenario 2, when s is su¢ ciently low such that the non-Annex I countrys self-
imposed constraint binds. It follows from (6) that ~y <
_
~y.6, which means that the non-Annex
I country will produce less than the maximum. When this is the case, the total level of
emissions from the Annex I and non-Annex I country is given by E2 = k + s and the total
production is Y2 = y+ ~y.
2.2 The model with the presence of the CDM
Now we consider what happens in the two countries after the CDM is introduced by the
Kyoto Protocol. As noted in the introduction, the CDM allows the Annex I country to meet
its allowed limit by sponsoring the emission abatement projects in the non-Annex I country.
Suppose, with the CDM, the cost of abatement for the Annex I country is given by c(a+ a^),
where a and a^ denote units of domestic abatement and abatement abroad, respectively and 
(where 0 <  < 1) captures the extent of cost reduction from sponsoring abatement projects
in the non-Annex I country. Note that, for the non-Annex I country, in addition to the cost
of investing in the CDM projects, the Annex I country also has to incur some cost towards
the purchase of CER credits from the non-Annex I country. The price of CERs is denoted by
6Same as for the case of the Annex I country, if ~c0(0)  ~, the non-Annex I country meets its self-imposed
limit on emissions solely through a reduction in output (i.e. ~a = 0); however, if ~c0(0) < ~, it will meet its
self-imposed limit through a combination of output reduction and abatement (i.e. ~a > 0).
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, where 0 <  < 1.7
Suppose the Annex I country receives a CER credit, ; for each unit of abatement it
undertakes in the non-Annex I country, where 0 <   1. We assume that the CER credit,
, can be used by the Annex I country to meet its legally binding limit. Note that  =
1 corresponds with the situation where the Annex I country is given a full credit by the
CDM Executive Board. In order for the Annex I country to participate in the CDM project,
the benet it receives through CER credits should be more than the cost it incurred from
sponsoring the CDM project plus the purchase of CER credits. Therefore the participation
constraint that has to be satised is given by:
a^+ a^ < a^;
which simplies to
 < (1  ): (9)
In what follows, we study the decision problem of the Annex I country with the presence of
the CDM. The Annex I country chooses output, y, domestic abatement, a, and abatement in
the non-Annex I country, a^, to maximise its net benet subject to the constraint on emission:
max
y;a;a^
B(y)  c(a+ a^)  a^ (10)
subject to ey   a  a^  k; a  0; a^  0 and y > 0:
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions are given by:
B0(y) = e, y > 0; (11)
  c0(a+ a^), a  0; (12)
7The price of CER credit, , is determined by supply an demand of CER credits, which are normally traded
on the forward basis in the carbon market. However, for our modeling purpose, we have assumed that the
Annex I country can use information from the forward market for CER credit to nd out .
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  c0 (a+ a^) + ; a^  0; (13)
ey   a  a^ = k,  > 0: (14)
Let (y; a; a^) be the solutions to the maximisation problem (10). It follows from (9) that
the Annex I country will undertake all the required abatements in the non-Annex I country
to comply with its allowed limit due to the availability of a cheaper abatement option abroad,
thus a = 0 and a^ > 0. It can easily be inferred that y > y (because  < ). Therefore,
with the CDM, the Annex I country is able to expand its production. In order to comply
with its emission limit, it is necessary that the Annex I country undertakes more abatements
relative to the situation in which there is no CDM, i.e. a^ > a. The level of emissions in
the Annex I country is ey = k + a^.
Thus, with the exibility of sponsoring abatement projects in the non-Annex I country,
the net emission in the Annex I country goes up by the amount of CER credit it obtained,
a^.
For the non-Annex I country, after taking into account the abatement resulted from CDM
project sponsored by the Annex I country, a^, its decision problem becomes:
max
~y;~a
~B(~y)  ~c(~a) (15)
subject to ~e~y   ~a  s+ a^; ~a  0 and ~y > 0:
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions are:
~B0(~y) = ~~e, ~y > 0; (16)
~  ~c0(~a), ~a  0; (17)
~e~y   ~a  s+ a^, ~  0: (18)
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As in the benchmark analysis, there are two cases to be considered: when the non-Annex
I countrys self-imposed constraint (18) does not bind and when such constraint binds.
If the self-imposed constraint of the non-Annex I country does not bind in the absence of
CDM, it will not be binding after the CDM is introduced. Thus, with the CDM, the non-
Annex I country will continue to produce up to its maximum,
_
~y, and will choose to undertake
no abatement. Therefore, the net emissions in the non-Annex I country are ~e
_
~y   a^, while
the net emissions in the Annex I country are k + a^. In this case, the level of emissions in
the non-Annex I country goes down by the amount of abatement achieved through the CDM
project sponsored by the Annex I country, while the level of emissions in the Annex I country
increases by the amount of CER credits it obtains from sponsoring the abatement abroad
under the CDM initiative. It follows that the total emissions across the two countries are8
E1 = k + ~e
_
~y   (1  ) a^: (19)
The last term on the RHS of (19) given by (1  ) a^ is the partial credit e¤ect. It is important
to note that, if the Annex I country receives a full credit for undertaking its abatements abroad
(i.e.  = 1), the presence of CDM will not have any e¤ect on the total level of emissions across
the two countries as E1 = E1 = k + ~e
_
~y. All it does is to provide a more e¢ cient allocation
of abatement, which may improve the Annex I countrys compliance with the legally binding
emission limit under the Kyoto Protocol. This is indeed one of the objectives the CDM aims
to achieve. However, if the Annex I country receives only a partial credit (i.e. when  < 1),
the CDM can lead to a reduction in the total emissions across the two countries as E1 < E1.
So, the lower is , the greater will be the reduction in total emissions.
The total production across the two countries is Y 1 = y
+
_
~y. Since y > y it follows that
Y 1 > Y1. This implies that the presence of CDM increases the total level of production across
the two countries.
Next, we consider what happens in the non-Annex I country if its self-imposed constraint
8E1 = ~e
_
~y   a^ + k + a^:
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binds. Condition (18) now becomes:
~e~y   ~a = s+ a^, ~ > 0:
Let ( ~y, ~a) denote the solution to the programme given in (15). If the self-imposed
constraint binds, before the CDM is introduced by the Kyoto Protocol, the non-Annex I
country is forced to produce less than
_
~y. The abatement resulted from the CDM project
sponsored by Annex I country relaxes the non-Annex I countrys self-imposed constraint,
thus it allows the non-Annex I country to produce more while still complying with its self-
imposed emission limit, e~y   a^ = s. Thus the net emissions in the non-Annex I country
remain unchanged at s. Note that ~y < ~y 
_
~y.
Therefore, on part of the non-Annex I country, the presence of CDM project in the non-
Annex I country, leads to an increase in the emissions in the non-Annex I country by an
amount a^, which is the abatement resulted from the CDM project. On part of the Annex I
country, its domestic emissions increase by a^, which is the CER credits it obtained from its
sponsored CDM project. In this case, the total emissions across the two countries are given
by:
E2 = k + a^
 + s+ a^   a^ (20)
=E2   a^ + a^ + a^:
The rst term on the RHS of (20), E2, is the global level of emissions across the two
countries before the CDM was introduced. The second term, a^ is the reduction in emissions
in non-Annex I country because of the abatement e¤orts of Annex I country through the
CDM project. The third term, a^, is the double counting e¤ect, which shows the increase in
the emissions by non-Annex I country in response to the abatements carried out under the
CDM project sponsored by the Annex I country. The last term is the partial credit e¤ect,
which shows the increase in the emissions in Annex I resulted from the CER credit it obtained
from the CDM project it sponsored.
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It is clear that
E2 = E2 + a^
; (21)
and E2 > E2 for all values of  > 0: When  = 1, the total emission across the two countries
increases by the entire amount of abatement undertaken under the CDM project, and E2 =
E2 + a^
. The higher is , the greater will be the level of total emissions when CDM is in
operation. Therefore, when the non-Annex I countrys self-imposed constraint binds, the
CDM results in a rise in the global level of emissions so long as  > 0.
Our analysis clearly demonstrates that in both cases - when the self-imposed constraint
on emission for the non-Annex I binds and does not bind, partial credit should be given by
the CDM Executive Board so that  is as low as possible. The lower is the amount of CER
credit the Annex I country receives, the greater will be the reduction in the total emissions
due to the presence of CDM. However, the partial credit should be carefully chosen by the
CDM Executive Board: in particular,  should be chosen in such a way that the Annex I
countrys participation constraint is satised so that the Annex I country has an incentive to
participate in the CDM.
To summarise, what are the total level of emissions under both cases? We have shown that
the presence of CDM results in an increase in the level of emissions in the Annex I country.
Moreover, the presence of the CDM results in an increase in the emissions in the non-Annex
I country whose self-imposed constraint on emissions binds. However, there is no change in
the level of emission in the non-Annex I country if its self-imposed constraint does not bind.
On the whole, the total emissions across the two countries increase as a result of the CDM.
With the presence of CDM, the total production across the two countries when the self-
imposed constraint of the non-Annex I country binds is Y 2 = y
 + ~y. Note that Y 2 > Y2
because both the Annex I country and the non-Annex I country are able to produce more
with the presence of CDM. The increase in production in the Annex I country does not di¤er
across the two cases. The extent of the increase in the Annex I country goes up with the
extent of CER credit, . If the Annex I country is given a full CER credit, its production will
increase by the entire amount of abatements undertaken through the CDM project sponsors.
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However, if the non-Annex I country is not bound by its self-imposed limit, the existence of
the CDM does not change its level of production.
With the above results in mind, the question that arises is how to make the CDM work
more e¤ectively in reducing the total emissions across the two countries? We argue that the
CDM will be more e¤ective if the self-imposed constraint of the non-Annex country that hosts
the CDM project does not bind since, in this case, the non-Annex I country will not respond
to the presence of CDM project by expanding its production. This suggests that the CDM
Executive Board should allow the CDM projects to be hosted by the non-Annex I country that
has high emission toleration levels. Even though it may be argued that at present, several non-
Annex I countries tend to have quite high levels of emission toleration levels, it is important
to keep in mind that over time, the toleration level can change. The authorities overseeing
the operation of the CDM should be alert to how a country hosting CDM projects change
with respect to its sensitivity to emission levels. Once its emission toleration level becomes
su¢ ciently low so that the non-Annex I country would be producing such that the constraint
binds at its toleration level, the authority should be cautious in approving such non-Annex I
countries to host the CDM projects. As demonstrated in our analysis, in such a situation, the
non-Annex I country will respond to abatement by CDM projects, by increasing production,
emitting more9
3 Conclusion
The CDM has attracted substantial interest from both non-Annex I and Annex I countries
alike because of its cost e¤ectiveness and exibility for the Annex I countries in meeting
their emission reduction targets under the Kyoto Protocol. This paper formally models some
important issues on the operation of CDM and evaluates the e¢ cacy of CDM. Specically, we
ask whether or not this mechanism can lead to a reduction in the overall level of greenhouse-
gas emissions across the two countries. The results from our analysis show that the net impact
of CDM is ambiguous.
9Following COP15, some of the non Annex I countries might impose s in such a way that they could be in
the category where the constraint binds.
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On one hand, some greenhouse-gas emissions are reduced due to the CDM projects spon-
sored by the Annex I country in the non-Annex I country. On the other hand, emissions
can be increased due to the following reasons. Annex I country increases domestic emissions
because of the CER credits it receives from sponsoring the CDM project. The outcome in the
non-Annex I country critically depends on its emission toleration level. If the non-Annex I
countrys emission toleration level is su¢ ciently low, it will respond to the abatement through
CDM projects, by increasing emissions. In this case, total emissions will, in fact, increase.
However, if the non-Annex I countrys emission toleration level is quite high, its emissions do
not change in response to the CDM projects. In this case, total emissions is reduced by the
amount of abatement carried out through the CDM projects.
From our analysis, we emphasise how to make the CDM work more e¤ectively. One is that
CDM projects should be approved to be hosted only by non-Annex I countries which have
higher emission toleration level than what would be emitted at its optimal production capacity.
This will help ensure that the non-Annex I countries will not o¤-set the benets of the CDM
projects by expanding their production thus increasing the total emissions. This point adds
to the literature on the distribution of CDM projects across the non-Annex I countries. The
CDM Executive Board should not only consider income as the factor in making its decision
on which non-Annex I countries should host the CDM projects, but also these countries
concerns about environment. The model also shows that only partial credit should be given
to the Annex I countries that sponsor the CDM project, but it should be just high enough to
ensure Annex I countrys participation in the CDM scheme. This argument could potentially
shed some light on the issue of spurious credits widely discussed in CDM circles.
For future research, it would be interesting to see what would happen if more than one
non-Annex I country competes for sponsorship from the Annex I country under the CDM.
Moreover, in order to incorporate the fact that a penalty is imposed on the Annex I country
which fails to comply with the emission reduction targets, the model should be extended to a
dynamic framework.
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4 Appendix I: The Operation of the CDM
The CDM is supervised by the CDM Executive Board and is under the guidance of the
Conference of the Parties (COP/MOP) of UNFCCC. The underlying principles of the CDM
consist of the following: (i) a voluntary participation by host countries, (ii) the use of the CDM
must be supplemental to non-Annex I countriesdomestic actions to reduce GHG emissions
and ensure additionality of the CDM projects, (iii) assist the developing countries in achieving
sustainable development, and (iv) certied by the CDM Executive Board. Among these
principles, a crucial feature of an approved CDM project is an establishment of additionality.
To ensure additionality, the proposed CDM project must reduce GHG emissions more than
what would have occurred in the absence of the project. In other words, the CDM project
is considered to be additional if the emissions from the project are lower than the baseline.
The baseline of the project is usually resulted from a construction of a hypothetical scenario
of what would have occurred without the CDM project. Often the project baseline can be
estimated through reference to emissions from similar activities and technology in the same
country or other countries, or to actual emissions prior to the implementation of CDM project.
The independent third party must make sure that parties involved in the CDM projects are
not allowed to establish a baseline with unrealistically high emissions, which would result in
a risk of CDM Executive Board awarding spurious credits.
The registration and approval process for the CDM is as follows. First, the CDM project
developer and the consultant prepare the Project Design Document (PDD). Second, the Des-
ignated National Authority (DNA) would issue the Letter of Approval (LOA) to certify the
project before registering the project with the CDM Executive Board. Third, the Designated
Operational Entity (DOE), which gives advice to the CDM Executive Board validate and
verify the amount of carbon credit10 resulted from the CDM project. The CDM Executive
Board then issues certied emission reduction (CERs). To compensate the non-Annex I coun-
tries from investing in the projects that lead to reduction in GHG emissions, the non-Annex
10Carbon credit is the amount of GHG emission being reduced as a result of the CDM CDM project.
Carbon credit is considered to be a type of commodities being traded in the carbon market. The carbon credit
is measured in ton of carbon dioxide per year (tCO2 = year) and the amount of GHG reduction after the
certication process is known as certied emission reduction (CERs).
21
I countries which are hosting the CDM projects can sell the CERs to the Annex I countries.
The revenue from the sales of CERs is then used by the non-Annex I countries to nance
additional/future investment in the GHG reduction projects.
The CERs from CDM projects are traded in the carbon market on a forward basis. The
price of CERs depends crucially on the distribution of risk between sellers and buyers of CERs.
Some of the determinants include timing and size of CERs, guarantee of delivery of registered
CERs, validation and certication costs, etc.
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